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practice of self-censorship,' the possibility of depriving a publisher and
the public of the right to communicate without prior restraint has not been
eliminated.
JOHN J. TOYNSEN, JR.

FoR TIE FRAUDULENT PROCUREMENT Op A REARE PROH1BITED By STATUTE.-Plaintiff purchased a used auto-

PUNAT1VE DAMAGES
LEASE

mobile for $495. As a downpayment he was allowed *200 for a 1937 truck
and a 1949 automobile. The balance was financed by a conditional sales contract, which was assigned to a finance company. As part of the same transaction the conditional sales vendor purchased a dual-interest insurance
policy from the defendant company. This policy provided that in the event
of a collision or upset, the plaintiff and the finance company, as their interests might appear, would receive the actual cash value of the automobile
at the time of the loss, less $50. Ten days after the purchase plaintiff was
involved in an accident. At that time $330 was owing to the finance company. Upon notification of the accident, the defendant's adjuster conducted an investigation and submitted a report to the defendant company
ascertaining the total loss to the insured to be $330. Subsequently a release was submitted to the plaintiff for his signature. By the provisions of
the release the plaintiff, in consideration of payment of $330 to the finance
company, discharged the defendant from further liability. Although the
plaintiff read this instrument, the jury found that he executed it in reliance on the representation made to him by the defendant's adjuster that
there would be "something" left over for him, either the interest in the
policy or another car. The finance company received $330, and the plaintiff $9.81 representing hte unearned premiums of the policy. Plaintiff,
contending that he did not receive the "something" promised him by the
adjuster, brought this action proceeding on a tort theory based on fraud.
The jury awarded him $115 compensatory damages and $750 punative

2'The end result of the proceeding will possibly be a greater threat of self-censorship
practice than before. The fear that causes self-censorship is still a delay with consequential financial loss, but it is magnified by subjecting the publisher to a hearing where suspicious circumstances will be paraded before the Hearing Examiner in
an effort to show that he had knowledge. This is not considered by the majority
in the instant case.
It Is reasonable to suppose that this publisher or any similar publisher does not
really fear economic loss with ultimate deprivation of constitutionally protected
advertising. The magazines are designed for homosexuals and are sold to them to
the extent of the precise limits tolerated by our obscenity law. This should provide
a basis for finding scienter from the circumstances. In the Smith case the Court
recognized that personal knowledge is not necessary and that circumstantial knowledge would satisfy the requirement. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 154 (1959).
Here, however, Justices Harlan and Stewart would not find scienter satisfied
by the circumstances. 'This is not in keeping with the modern trend advocated by
Paul and Schwartz. They would root the test for obscenity in a study of commercial
exploitation and conduct of the individuals. Looking to the circumstances would
force the conduct of the individual into the foreground, and a new, more effective
basis for determining obscenity would be provided. PAUL & ScHwARTZ, FEDERAL CENSOPSHIP-OBScENITY IN THE MArLs 214 (1962).

See dissenting opinions of Mr.

Chief Justice Warren in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) and Kingsley
Book Co. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957).
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damages. On appcal to the Montana Supreme Court, held, reversed and remanded. The trial court erred in assuming this to be a tort action and refusing to instruct the jury on the law of release. Punative damages may
not be assessed in this case because this is an action based on contract.
Westfall v. Motors Insurance Corporation,374 P.2d 96 (Mont. 1962) (Mr.
Justice Adair, dissenting).
The Montana Supreme Court concluded that a release is a contract
and as such is subject to recission for fraud or mistake of fact the same as
other contracts. The court further concluded that since the plaintiff alleged that the release was procurred through fraud, an issue of fact was
raised to be decided by the jury under proper instruction. If the jury
should find that there was sufficient fraud to avoid the release, they could
then decide whether the defendant breached the insurance contract. Much
of the court's opinion is devoted to the law of release and voidability. This
seems to indicate that the court would have the plaintiff avoid the release and sue for the breach of contract, despite the fact that he predicated
his action on fraud. The law is well established that when more than one
remedy is available, the injured party may select the one which he wishes
to pursue.' When a party, as in the instant case, has been fraudulently
induced to execute a contract, he may either rescind and be restored to his
former position, or affirm and sue for damages resulting from the fraud.'
However, the court in the instant case quite irregularly permitted the defendant to select the plaintiff's cause of action, for it was the defendant
who first asserted that the plaintiff predicated his action upon a "voidable
release. '"
The court was thus led to the conclusion that this was an action for
the breach of an obligation arising from contract and, as such, refused to
permit the assessment of punative damages because of section 17-208 of the
Revised Codes of Montana,' 1947, which provides:
In any action for a breach of an obligation not arising from
contract, where the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud,
or malice, actual or presumed, the jury in addition to the actual
damages, may give damages for the sake of example, and by way
of punishing the defendant.'
Apparently this was the first time the Montana Supreme Court found
it necessary to construe this statute. To assist them in this matter the
court looked to the case of Crogan v. Metz,' in which the California Supreme
Court construed an almost identical statute.' That case involved an action
by a client against real estate brokers to recover secret profits. The ap'Griffiths v. Thrasher, 95 Mont. 210, 26 P.2d 995 (1933) ; Beebe v. James, 91 Mont.
403, 8 P.2d 803 (1932).
'IbidZ.
3Instant case at 98. Defendant contended this was an action upon a voidable release
and at the trial offered instruction to that effect; however, the district court refused to instruct on the question of release and proceeded on a tort theory based

on fraud.

'(Hereinafter REvisEw CoDms OF MONTANA will be cited R.C.M.).
'(Emphasis added.)
047 Cal. 2d 398, 303 P.2d 1029 (1956).
'CALIFORNrTA CIVIL CODE § 3294. This statute is identical to R.C.M. 1947, § 17-208 except for the substitution of the words "express or implied" for the words "actual or
presumed".
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pellate court was satisfied that the evidence was sufficient to warrant a
finding by the jury that the defendant was guilty of fraudulently misrepresenting the price of certain property. In so doing, the defendant induced the plaintiff to purchase the property at a higher price than the
vendor was asking, thus permitting him to retain the difference. The jury
awarded the plaintiff punative damages, but the appellate court reversed.
The Montana Supreme Court adopted the following language from that
decision:'
(A)n award [for punative damages] may not be granted in
an action based on a breach of contract even though the defendant's breach was willful or fraudulent.
This seems to be a most proper application of the statute to the facts
of the Crogan case, but not to the facts of the instant case. In the Crogan
case the plaintiff framed his complaint in three counts, but on two different theories, the first and third based on fraud, and the second in the
nature of the common count for money had and received. The court recognized that the plaintiff had the right to elect his remedy, but as he had
not elected it became a matter for the judge or jury.' Further, when an
appeal it taken from such a judgment the reviewing court may disregard
the theory elected by the trial court, if on another theory the case may be
disposed of without retrial.' It was contended that the trial court committed prejudicial error in refusing to admit certain evidence relevant to
the theories set forth in the counts based on fraud. However, the appellate
court found it unnecessary to answer this question by electing to affirm on
count two, which was based on contract. Thus, the breach of an agent's
contractual duty was the only action sustainable under the pleadings. However, in the instant case the plaintiff elected not to rescind but to affirm
the contract, and proceeded on a tort theory based on fraud.
The court in the instant case was led to the conclusion that if thc
plaintiff suffered any injury, it was from defendant's failure to perform
the insurance contract by misrepresenting the value of the demolished
automobile." It appears that the court failed to recognize that the plaintiff
alleged two frauds, (1) the fraudulent misrepresentation of the value of
the automobile, and (2) the fraudulent promise of the adjuster that there
would be "something" left over for the plaintiff. The second fraud is that
which induced the plaintiff to sign the release. If the defendant had not
committed the second fraud and had in fact given the plaintiff that which
had been promised him, he would have had no cause of action on any
theory. The fraudulent promise of the defendant's adjuster is a breach,
not of an obligation arising from contract, but of an obligation imposed
by law.' Plaintiff's action is not based on contract, as it was not that which
8

Instant case at 99.

9

Supra note 6, 303 P.2d at 1032.
"'Ibid.
"'Instantcase at 100.
"R.C.M 1947, § 58-102 states: "An obligation arises either from:

1. The contract of the parties; or,

2. The operation of law.
An obligation arising from operation of law may be enforced by civil action
or proceeding or in the manner provilled by law."
See Harper v. Interstate Brewery Co., 168 Or. 26, 120 P.2d 757, 762 (1942) in which
the court inquired into the nature of the right which was invaded to determine

whether the wrongdoer was subject to an action in tort or In contract.
Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1962
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was written in the release that injured him, but rather it was the fraudulent promise of the defendan't adjuster upon which plaintiff relied to
his detriment. Following this reasoning it would seem that the case is
taken out of the prohibitory provisions of R.C.M. 1947, Section 17-208, and
punative damages should have been permitted even though the action ineidentally involved a breach of contract. In the case of Garden City Floralv.
Hunt,' the Montana Supreme Court said :"
Ordinarily, where there is no duty except such as the contract creates, the plaintiff's remedy is for breach of contract,
but when the breach of duly alleged arises out of a liability independently of the personal obligation undertaken by contract, it
is a tort.

R.C.M. 1947, Section 58-601 provides that "Every person is bound,
without cantra t, to abstain from injuring the person or property of another, or infringing upon any of his rights."' ' Clearly the plaintiff had
the right not to be defrauded, and the fraudulent promise of the defendant's adjuster is just as clearly a breach of this statutory duty. In principle,
the California case of Ward v. Taggart"o is applicable here. That case involved a fraudulent scheme in which the vendor's asking price for some
real property was fraudulently misrespresented to the plaintiff. Plaintiff
purchased the property at the misrepresented price. Upon discovery of the
fraud he brought suit for compensatory and punative damages. As a defense to the assessment of punative damages the defendant sought to invoke statutory provisions " which prohibit the assessment of punative damages in an action based on contract, and cited the Crogan" case in support
of his position. That case was distinguished" by the court however, and
punative damages were held to be properly assessable. In the language of
Mr. Justice Traynor, speaking for the majority' of the court: '
(S)ection [3294 of the California Civil Code] authorizes exenplary damages "in an action for the breach of an obligation not
arising from contract, where the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice**"." The word "contract" is used in
this section in its ordinary sense to mean an agreement between
the parties, not an obligation imposed by law despite the absence of
any such agreement. Taggart's obligation does not arise from any
agreement between him and plaintiffs. It arises from his fraud and
violation of statutory duties. His fraud is not waived, for it is the
very foundation of the implied-in-law promise to disgorge.
This construction and application does not seem to violate either the
letter or the spirit of the statute, but rather it increases its effectiveness
'126 Mont. 537, 255 P.2d 352 (1953).
"Ibid, 126 Mont. at 543 (emphasis added.) cf Foster v. Keating, 120 Cal. App.
2d 435, 261 P.2d 529 (1953) ; Murphy Auto Sales, Inc., v. Coomer, 123 Ind. App. 2d
121,112 N.E.2d 589 (1953).
( Emphasis added.)
"51 Cal. App. 2d 736, 336 P.2d 534 (1959).
'7Supra note 7.
'Supra note 6.
'Supra note 16, 336 P.2d at 538.
OMr. Justice Schauer concurred in the result, but dissented on issues not revelant
here.
'Supra note 19.
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as a deterrent to the specified wrongful acts of oppression, fraud and
malice. It does not appear, however, that the Montana court thought that
there was any compelling reason to punish in the instant case. Plaintiff
cited the case of Hobbs v. Smith,' in which the Oklahoma court awarded
punative damages when the defendant, knowing his hogs were diseased,
sold them to the plaintiff in violation of a penal statute. The court in the
instant case summarily dismissed that case saying that ".

.

. perhaps the

compulsion to punish and make an example of the defendant is greater
in the Hobbs case than it is in this case.'
This seems to indicate that the
Montana court would permit the assesment of punative damages, under
the facts of the instant case, if they believed the fraud was sufficiently
gross, despite their interpretation of R.C.M. 1947, Section 17-208. If this
is true the court is left with an additional task of classifying fraud into
degrees; that which would permit punatIve damages, and that which
would prohibit them.
It does not seem that proper consideration was given to the Hobbs
case. The Oklahoma court concluded that they were in harmony with the
common law and the great weight of authority in holding that :'
(A)lthough the relation between the parties may have been
established by contract, express or implied, if the law imposes
certain duties because of the existance of that relation, the contract obligation may be waived, and an action in tort maintained
for the violation of such imposed duties.
The court in the instant case does not refer to this proposition although it seems most relevant to plaintiff's position. It then seems by
implication that the plaintiff does not have the right to waive the contract
and sue in tort. This is contrary to the weight of authority.' Any other
position leads to the conclusion that there was no tort upon which plaintiff
could predicate his action. This is fallacious as it was established by the
jury in the trial court that the defendant was guilty of fraud.
In as much as the court does consider the Hobbs case, it expresses
the opinion that the compulsion to punish the defendant may have been
greater in that case than in the instant one. However, considering the purwhether he committed the fraud or not. The general practice of the courts
pose of punative damages as punishment for a civil wrong and as a deterrent to others, the reverse seems true. In the Hobbs case, the defendant
not only assumed a risk of liability in actual damages in excess of anything
he could hope to profit through the commission of fraud,' but he was also
subject to punishment for the violation of a penal statute. In the instant
case, however, the defendant, in absence of punative damages, assumed no
risk by his misconduct, as the judgment against him would be the same
"27 Oki. 830, 115 Pac. 347 (1911).
"Instant case at 99.
"'Supranote 22,115 Pac. at 350.
'Hobbs v. Smith, 27 Oki. 830, 115 Pac. 347 (1911) (See cases cited therein). No
cases have been found which overrule this proposition.
rThe defendant there was liable for the damages caused as a result of the spreading
of the disease to the plaintiff's hogs as well as those which he had sold, and
further for the expenses incurred in disinfecting plaintiff's pens. It Is conceivable
that a large number of hogs may be infected before the buyer discovers the disease.
Apparently the defendant would be liable for any damages which naturally flowed
from his wrongful act.
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is to award punative damages in those cases in which the defendant assumes no risk in perpetrating the fraud.' The purpose of such an award
is to discourage oppression, fraud or malice."
Although the court indicates to the contrary, it seems that there were
very impelling reasons to assess punative damages in the instant case.
Statutory provisions permit the jury to assess punative damages in any
action, except for breach of contract, where the defendant has been guilty
of fraud. As the statute indicates, this is done for the purpose of punishing
the defendant and to set an example for others. Here the defendant was
guilty of fraud. The fraud was an invasion of a right of the plaintiff
given by law. In the absence of punative damages the plaintiff has no
remedy for the invasion of this right. It is an anomaly for the law to give
a right for which it gives no remedy.' The mere fact that the plaintiff may
recover for the breach of a contractual obligation should not be a defense,
either to the breach of an obligation imposed by law, or the assesment
of punative damages when such breach is proved.
The instant case presents a matter of general public concern. The
number of transactions in which releases are involved is increasing daily.
It seems that a primary purpose of the law is to protect the members of
society from the invasion of their rights; in this case; from the fraudulent
procurement of releases. It is submitted that the decision in the instant
case does not achieve this purpose.
Regardless of whether plaintiff elected to sue for breach of the contract, or to proceed on a tort theory, he had to prove exactly the same
elements. R.C.M 1947, section 58-509 provides: "An obligation is extinguished by a release therefrom given to the debtor by the creditor, upon
a new consideration, or in writing, with or without new consideration."
Thus the release consituted a bar to recovery on either a contract or tort
theory unless plaintiff could first prove fraud in the procurement of the
release. Plaintiff did prove fraud in the procurement of the release, and
also proved breach of -the insurance contract. Although plaintiff proved
all of the elements necessary to recover on either theory of law, the court
limited his recovery to damages sustained because of the breach of the
contract. Further, the court imposed this limitation even though plaintiff
had elected to proceed on a tort theory. The court's limitation is contra
to established principles of law, i.e., that when more than one remedy is
available, the injured party may select the one he wishes to pursue.'
As a practical matter, this decision invites the perpetration of fraud.
Even though there may have been a breach of contract, if the plaintiff
fails to convince the jury that the release was procured by fraud, defendant
is not obligated to pay for the breach. If the plaintiff does prove fraud in
the procurement of the release, and then proves breach of the contract,
defendant is liable only in damages for the breach of contract, since the
court has, in the instant case, limited the plaintiff's cause of action to
breach of contract. Since defendant will in any case not be liable for
punative damages, defendant has really assumed no risk of loss by the
"Supra note 19, and cases cited therein.
"Ibid.
01 AM. JuR. Actions § 9 (1936).
BGriffiths v. Thrasher, 95 Mont. 210, 26 P.2d 995 (1933) ; Beebe v. James, 91 Mont.
403, 8 P.2d 803 (1932).
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commission of the fraud. As previously noted, the general practice is to
allow punative damages where the defendant has assumed no risk in
perpetrating the fraud.'
As a further inducement to the perpetration of fraud, the possibility of
gain is provided. Practically speaking, the defrauded party may find the
cost of bringing suit prohibitive. On the other hand, an insurance company
generally retains a permenant legal staff and can well afford the cost of
defending those suits which are prosecuted. As a consequence, many victims
of fraud will not prosecute, thus permitting the wrongdoer to profit without
the necessity of successfully defending a suit. It is submitted that, where
punative damages are a probable risk to a party, it might be found economically impractical to engaged in fraudulent activities. In order to circumvent
the above problems, it seems that the plaintiff should properly have been allowed to proceed in tort and punative damages should have been allowed.
For the foregoing reasons, it is urged upon the court that it reconsider
the position taken in this case.
MYRON E. PITCH

CONTRACT

CLAUSE PROVIDING

FOR ARBITRATION OF FUTURE DISPUTES

Is NOT ENFORCEABLE IN MONTANA.-Plaintiff entered into an agreement

with defendant whereby plaintiff agreed to lease land from defendant and
run steers on it for a period of four years. Defendant was -to supply 600
steers per year and at the end of each year, the steers were to be sold and the
proceeds divided. This was done without incident for two years, but during
the third year, defendant placed on the land 120 heifers in addition to the
steers. A dispute arose over whether the heifers were to be handled under
the terms of the agreement. Finally defendant sold both the heifers and the
steers without the knowledge or consent of the plaintiff and appropriated
the proceeds. Plaintiff remained on the land until the termination of the
lease but no more cattle were run under the agreement. After some futile
discussion between the parties, plaintiff instituted this suit for his share
of the disputed proceeds and the profit he would have made had they continued as the contract stipulated. One of the defenses asserted related to
paragraph six of the contract which reads: "Any difference between the
parties under this lease that cannot be settled after thorough discussion,
shall be submitted for arbitration by a committee of three disinterested
persons, one selected by each party here to and the third by the two thus
selected, and their decision shall be accepted by both parties." Defendant
contended that plaintiff had refused to arbitrate and was thus barred from
proceeding with the suit. The court ruled against defendant on all counts
and judgment was entered for the plaintiff. On appeal to the Montana
Supreme Court, held, affirmed. The rights of parties to free access to the
courts cannot be interfered with and any such interference is void as viola-

151 Cal, App. 2d 736, 336 P.2d 534, 538 (1959).
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